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I.

INTRODUCTION

The practice of tax law is fundamentally the practice of statutory
interpretation.
For the most part, though, the scholarly tax
community has been relatively indifferent to the work of our
colleagues who teach and write in the realm of interpretative theory.1
One area in which this oversight is becoming increasingly apparent is
in our efforts to grapple with the policy challenge offered by the tax
shelter industry.
In recent years tax shelter regulation has been complicated by the

fact that the government's litigation tools for combating shelters
derive from a different era in the intellectual history of the judicial

interpretation of statutes.2 The foremost of these tools, the "economic
substance doctrine," is a common law rule3 crafted by a Supreme

Court 4 that was entirely comfortable saying of another tax statute that
"[l]ife in all its fullness must supply" the best interpretation.

That is

not our Court, and it often is not our lower federal courts, either. We
live in an era in which textualism - loosely conceived as fidelity to
I For some notable exceptions, see Deborah A. Geier, Textualism and Tax
Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 445 (1993); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason,
"Purposivism," and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996);
Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REV. 819 (1991); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's
Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71 (1996); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral
Interpretationsof the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986). There are
only a few brief efforts in the tax shelter arena. See Joseph Bankman, The Economic
Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 11-14 (2000); Robert Thornton Smith,
Business Purpose: The Assault upon the Citadel, 53 TAx LAW. 1, 14-20 (1999).
Another important article, Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and
Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004), includes a discussion on the place of
legislative history in tax interpretation, id. at 7-19, a subject I set to one side here, as a
prelude to its insightful discussion of administrative law principles underlying the
Internal Revenue Service's (Service) partnership anti-abuse regulations, id. at 32-61.
2 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note
1, at 2.
3 Bankman, supra note 1, at 7-11.
4 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
5 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1933).
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the words of the statute - now reigns over the more free-wheeling
methods of Cardozo and Holmes.6
Thus, we now see decisions in which courts read the economic
substance doctrine narrowly, if they are willing to apply it at all.7 We
can only guess at what goes on in the minds of other tax planners, but
this development almost certainly has to have made a difference in the
way that lawyers and others think about how to arrange their affairs."

In addition to the "audit lottery," we now have a sort of "textualist
lottery." 9 Even Knetsch, tax law's most famous economic substance
loser, ° might try his deal with the Sam Houston Company again in
today's climate; one never knows when a court will decide that the
literal words of a statute are as far as it need go in deciding the tax
treatment of any transaction. Early defense filings in the prosecution

of the KPMG shelter promoters suggest that this exact dynamic may
See Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: InterpretiveRegimes, 38 Loy. L.A.
L.
REV. 1909, 1911 (2005) (summarizing empirical study analyzing Supreme Court's use
of interpretive methods). For a study of the Supreme Court's historical practices, see
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation:An Empirical
Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1073, 1091-113 (1992).
7 See infra note 26. Of course, the Government has also won
in some cases in
which taxpayers raised textualist arguments, most prominently in a recent case in the
Federal Circuit. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir.
2006); ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 247-63 (3d Cir. 1998). My claim
here is not that textualism inevitably will prevail in all litigated cases, only that it is
likely at least to succeed often enough to impact tax planning. For example, the
occasional textualist opinion may reduce the potential downside to tax planning. A
taxpayer is generally safe from both civil and criminal penalties if she relies upon tax
advice with "substantial authority" to support it. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S.
192, 201 (1991) (holding that defendant cannot be guilty of tax offense unless he
intentionally violates a known legal duty); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(a), (d) (2005)
(defining standard for civil penalties). Whether authority is "substantial" is a
balancing test, and is "less stringent than the more likely than not standard," Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2), (3), such that, while a single textualist opinion might be
insufficient authority, a series of them, might well be enough to encourage taxpayers
to rely on a textualist position with the hopes of, at worst, a loss with no penalties.
8 Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, the Cash Economy, and
Compliance Costs, 31 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005); Cunningham & Repetti, supra
note 1, at 4, 27-28; Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The
Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325,
361 (2002).
9 Cf Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1947 (2005) (arguing that, in
addition to audit lottery, taxpayers also may gamble that they will prevail in court by
denying applicability of economic substance doctrine).
'0Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
6
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be at the heart of the defendants' case: how could they have "known"

that the shelters they offered were contrary to a "legal duty," when it
was possible that some textualist court would support their tax claims
irrespective of their transactions' total lack of economic substance?
Other commentators have recognized the importance of the
textualist revolution for the shelter problem. 12 Many have noted that
judicial reluctance to invoke the common law methods of yore may
oblige Congress to codify some of the doctrines, such as economic
substance, that courts have in the past used to combat abusive tax
avoidance (whatever "abusive" may mean). 3 Indeed, both the Senate
and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) have proposed codified
versions of the economic substance doctrine, although apparently
Treasury is not enthusiastic. 14 Textualism is an elephant in the room
in an important scholarly alternative to the JCT's proposal, set out in
a recent Columbia Law Review essay by Marvin Chirelstein and Larry
Zelenak." Chirelstein and Zelenak urge us, in essence, to abandon
hope in economic substance and instead to pursue a pair of bright-line
rules designed to cut off what they see as the most damaging forms of
modern shelters. 16 All of these efforts are thorough, carefully
considered, and draw on far more real-world tax experience than is
available to this author.
11 Memorandum of Law in Support of Certain Defendants' Motion To Dismiss
the Charging Portions of the Indictment Involving FLIP, OPIS and BLIPS on the
Ground that the Prosecutors Misled and Misinformed the Grand Jury Concerning the
Applicable Law and Material Facts, United States v. Stein, No. 05-CR-0888 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 12, 2006).
12 Bankman, supra note 8, at 3-5; Cunningham & Repetti,
supra note 1, at 2729; Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-Form
Doctrinesin Tax. Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 747-48 (2003).
13 See Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality:
Codifying Judicial
Doctrines, 54 SMU L. REV. 9, 34 (2001); Martin J. McMahon Jr., Beyond a GAAR:
Retrofitting the Code To Rein in 21st Century Tax Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 1721, 173437 (Mar. 17, 2003); Lee A. Sheppard, Drafting Economic Substance, Part 3, 106 TAX
NOTES 1020, 1025 (Feb. 28, 2005).
14 For the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) proposal, see STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS To IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND

REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES (Joint Comm. Print 2005). For the Senate's bill, see,
e.g., Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act of 2005, S. 1565, 109th Cong. § 301. On
Treasury's coolness to these types of proposals, see, e.g., Nomination of Pamela F.
Olson: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 107th Cong. (2002); Sheryl
Stratton, Shelter Disclosure, Doctrine Codification Debated, 99 TAX NOTES 25, 25
(Apr. 7, 2003) (reporting views of Treasury officials).
15 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1942.
16 Id.
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I want humbly to suggest, however, that the proposals could be
further improved by more extensive engagement with the theory
behind the textualist outcomes we see from some courts. For
example, I do not think it is by any means clear that the JCT's
proposal, if enacted, would succeed in changing the result in a court
with a voting majority of textualists. 7 To make that prediction, we
first have to understand what the textualists' objections are and then
consider carefully whether the JCT's proposal really meets them. I
argue here that it probably does not.
At the same time, Chirelstein and Zelenak may have decided that
the elephant is bigger than it really is. As I will attempt to show, it is
possible for a well-designed statute to overcome textualist arguments
against judicial invocation of broad policy tools such as the economic
substance doctrine. Indeed, such a statute could draw on many of the
insights Chirelstein and Zelenak offer, while at the same time
maintaining the flexibility to adapt to innovations in tax-sheltering
that seems somewhat lacking (by design) in their current proposal.
Finally, understanding the theory of textualism helps us to see
that many of the arguments against regulating tax shelters more
generally are fairly weak when confronted with a carefully drafted
statute. For example, critics of Professor Weisbach's powerful
challenge to tax planning raise what prove to be textualist-flavored
objections to any potential judicial solution. 18 Those objections, I
show, can be met relatively easily once we understand the actual
content of their claims.
Thus, in this article I not only lay out and analyze the
interpretative theory underlying textualist challenges to tax shelter
regulation, but also suggest a possible new - or, really, hybrid formulation of a codified economic substance doctrine. Many of the
particulars were crafted by others. My main effort here is to show
how the pieces can best be fit together to rebut textualist challenges.
The article proceeds in five parts. I begin the first part by
reviewing briefly the economic substance doctrine (the doctrine) and
its discontents.
The part quickly moves on to discuss several
suggestions to codify the doctrine, each of them aimed at shoring up
one or more weaknesses in its current, common law incarnation. Part
III.A explores the theoretical underpinnings of the textualist

17 Other commentators appear to have assumed that codification would oblige a

court to adhere to the newly codified economic substance doctrine. See infra note 63.
As I discuss here, that is not necessarily an obvious conclusion.
"' See infra text accompanying notes 157-58.
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challenge to judicial invocation of the economic substance doctrine.
Part III.B explains how the Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal
sidesteps those challenges, but then elaborates on why no sidestep
should be needed.
Part IV considers another textualist-inspired criticism of the
doctrine. Critics point out that purposivist efforts to identify shelters
are often paralyzed by the difficulty that Congress clearly does intend
to tax-favor some transactions. Given that the plain text is often our
best clue to congressional intent, it may be difficult to discern shelter
from subsidy. By obliging Congress to identify its intended taxfavored transactions by a clear statement, we can remove any doubt
that the remaining tax favors are accidents of drafting.
Part V applies these lessons. In particular, I argue that there
remains no particularly convincing argument against Weisbach's view
that the law should discourage all tax planning. Thus we might, for
example, pursue a codified doctrine that would permit the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) to disregard a taxpayer's characterization
of a transaction if one of several main purposes for engaging in any
part of the transaction is to realize a tax benefit or if no reasonable
businessperson would have carried out the transaction in that way, but
for the resulting tax benefits. Borrowing from Chirelstein and
Zelenak, I suggest that Congress could also carve out specifically
identified tax-favored transactions that would be exempt from recharacterization even if engaged in unreasonably or for tax avoidance
purposes. Combining these two steps largely resolves the theoretical
problems identified earlier.
I then conclude.
II. BACKGROUND

The economic substance doctrine is a set of judicially-crafted rules
of interpretation for tax statutes. 9 In general, the doctrine operates to
disallow a taxpayer's characterization of a particular business
transaction where, although the transaction in form meets the literal
terms of the statute, in substance it "seeks to claim tax benefits,
unintended by Congress."2 ° In this context Congress is usually
19

Bankman, supra note 1, at 7-11; Alexandra M. Walsh, Note, Formally Legal,

Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax Shelters, PracticalReason and the New Textualism,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1544 (2001).
20 ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (1997), affd, 157
F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998). In this article I do not make any effort to sort out the various
strands of common law doctrine, some of them occasionally appearing under other
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understood to intend to give tax-favorable treatment only to a
transaction that has a meaningful effect on the taxpayer's real
economic21 situation or that was entered into with a real business
purpose. Courts are divided on whether these standards must both
be met in order for a transaction to pass muster,22 disagree about how
to analyze the scope of a "transaction,, 23 and differ on how much risk
or possibility of profit must exist in order to qualify a transaction as
24
having economic substance.
While these variations can make for some complicated legal
analysis, the greater concern among policy makers is that,
increasingly, the economic substance doctrine is proving to have no
substance at all. 25 Since the mid-1980s, as "textualist" theories of
statutory interpretation have become more prevalent, courts have
grown increasingly skeptical of judge-made tax policy, especially
where that policy has the effect of negating the clear lexical meaning
26
of the text.
It was only a matter of time before textualist2 7 courts
began refusing to apply the economic substance doctrine at all.
In response to both sets of problems, the JCT has proposed
codifying the economic substance doctrine."' The JCT's proposal is, in
some senses, fairly limited. The proposal notes that it "only applies to
cases in which a court determines that the economic substance
doctrine is relevant" and expressly states that it is not intended to

names, that have similar effects as the economic substance doctrine. See Martin J.
McMahon, Jr., Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial Doctrines to Interpret the
Internal Revenue Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 195, 195 (2001) (describing differences
among doctrines as "abstract" and "fairly gossamer").
21 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra
note 14, at 14-16.
22 Bankman, supra note 1, at 26.
23 See id. at 15; David P. Hariton, Kafka and the Tax Shelter, 57
TAX L. REV. 1,
30 (2003).
24 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note
14, at 14-16; Lee A.

Sheppard, DraftingEconomic Substance, Continued,99 TAX NOTES 597, 598-99 (May
5, 2003).
25 See Samuel C. Thompson Jr., Despite Widespread Opposition, Congress
Should Codify the ESD, 110 TAX NOTES 781, 782 (Feb. 13, 2006).
26 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778,
784 (5th
Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 356 (8th Cir. 2001); ACM
P'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting);
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 740-41 (2004).
27 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 4, 26.
28 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining

"reasons for change").
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modify common law except as otherwise stated.29 What the proposal
would do is resolve a pair of circuit splits, by instructing that a valid
transaction must have both economic substance and business purpose
and by defining economic substance to require a "meaningful change
in the taxpayer's economic position., 30 Even these provisions would
apply only in the context of six "applicable transactions," which the
JCT finds to be most suspect, as well as in any others added by
Treasury. 3' Earlier, already enacted provisions provide for a forty
percent penalty for undisclosed transactions failing the test, which
drops to twenty percent if the transaction is disclosed.32
There are a variety of other proposals. Some (especially tax
practitioners) suggest adheringS31to the status quo, perhaps with some
additional disclosure requirements. Others tinker at the margins of
(or anticipate, with slight variation) the JCT plan, offering improved
wording of some of its provisions, a different resolution of the circuit
splits, and the like. 34
More radically, Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak have
suggested, in essence, giving up on efforts to write the economic
substance doctrine into law. They argue that efforts to elevate
economic substance will simply lead to tax shelters in which shelter
participants will insert just enough risk or chance for gain to meet the
minimum threshold for tax compliance.
They propose instead a
bright-line regime, in which Congress would flatly disallow
noneconomic losses, as well as noneconomic deferral of gain or
acceleration of loss through the use of tax-indifferent parties.36

However, they provide that Congress or Treasury may make
exceptions for certain noneconomic losses intended by Congress.37
Similarly, Professor Weisbach has noted that well-designed shelter
29
30
31

32

Id. at 18, 20.
Id. at 21-22.

Id. at 19-21, 28.
Id. at 17.

See, e.g., Hebert N. Belier, ABA Tax Section Offers Comments, Concerns
Regarding CARE Act Provisions, 2003 TNT 81-74 (Apr. 24, 2003); Michael P. Boyle,
TEl Opposes Revenue Raisers in Senate Tax Relief Bill, 2006 TNT 7-19 (Jan. 10,
2006); Thomas J. Purcell, III, AICPA Expresses Concerns over Some Tax Relief Act
Provisions, 2006 TNT 3-19 (Dec. 23, 2005); Bernard Wolfman, Letter to the Editor,
Why Economic Substance Is Better Left Uncodified, 104 TAX NOTEs 445, 445 (July 26,
2004) (arguing that codification would result in too much doctrinal rigidity).
34 See, e.g., Hariton, supra note 23, at 30-31, 33; Sheppard, supra note
24, at 600.
35 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1955, 1962.
33

36

Id. at 1952-53.

37

Id. at 1955-56.
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legislation should "require Congress to specify 3 8all intentional
subsidies and the manner in which they may be used.
A key aspect of the Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal is its
deliberate rigidity. Chirelstein and Zelenak, I suspect, would freely
concede at least that they have chosen the less flexible approach to
combating tax shelters; they are quite up front about their choice to
use, in essence, a "rule" rather than a "standard."39 That is, they
deliberately prefer to set out detailed prescriptions for dealing with
certain forms of transactions, with no apparatus in their scheme for
adjusting to subsequent efforts by taxpayers to achieve similar taxavoiding results by other means.40 One express rationale they offer
for their choice is that, in their view, it better provides for an effective
deterrent to would-be shelterers.4 I am somewhat skeptical of that
claim, for reasons I will explain in detail in Part V.
Chirelstein and Zelenak also offer another rationale, although
perhaps it is just slightly below the surface of their argument. Their
article, as well as Professor Zelenak's earlier writings, suggest
skepticism about whether judge-made tax doctrines can succeed in
doing anything other than replicating each individual judge's taxThus, tax-shelter-friendly judges will remain
policy preferences.4
friendly to shelters irrespective of codification of economic substance
doctrines.43 I want to suggest, in Part IV, that this worry is
fundamentally a textualist one and that Chirelstein and Zelenak's
terrific solution in fact can resolve it equally well in a less-rigid scheme
than the one they offer. First, though, I want to consider another
possible strength of their proposal.
38

David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 225

n.22 (2002).
39 For a discussion of the basic concept of the rule/standard tradeoff, see Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1687-88 (1976), and in tax law particularly, see Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the
Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 673, 699-702 (1969).
Professor Zelenak had already put his cards on the table about his distrust of
standards, and his search for a "silver-bullet" rule, four years earlier. Lawrence
Zelenak, Codifying Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 177, 185-86, 191-93 (2001).
40 Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1951. The duo argue, though,
that
their proposal is broad enough to prevent new shelters, id., which seems fairly
optimistic given the money at stake and talent available.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 1948, 1953.
43 See id. at 1949; Zelenak, supra note 39, at 186-87.
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III. DOES TEXTUALISM DOOM ANY EFFORT TO CODIFY ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE?

As I have mentioned, for many tax shelter commentators, the
most significant challenge posed by the rise of modern textualism is
not necessarily the force of its critique so much as the likelihood that
the textualist judge will reject existing efforts to regulate shelters. As
we will see in a moment, the textualist judge is likely to reject judgemade rules that supplement the actual words of a technical tax statute.
In other words, the textualist would not apply the economic substance
doctrine. Quite possibly, the textualist would hesitate to employ
common law methods, such as economic substance analysis, even if
strongly encouraged to do so by Congress. That would leave us, still,
with the possibility that shelter participants could continue to play the
"textualist lottery."
It might be said in favor of Chirelstein and Zelenak that their
proposal shortcuts this problem entirely. By substituting bright-line
rules for any judicial conclusions about whether a transaction has
economic substance, they sidestep the need to convince the textualist
it is
judge. While it is unclear whether that was one of their goals,
44
approach.
their
of
advantage
potential
significant
a
undeniably
As a result, in order to appraise our options, we first have to
understand the nature of the problem to be solved. Is there a serious
likelihood that textualists would resist even a codified economic
substance doctrine? If so, Chirelstein and Zelenak's offering looks
much more appealing. To be sure one way or the other, we would
have to understand better the reasons for the textualist's reluctance to
Is the problem a lack of
dabble in common law methods.
congressional authorization or is it something else, such as a general
doubt about, or constitutional constraint on, judicial power?
Surprisingly, there is no sustained consideration of that question, even
in the interpretative theory literature. In this part, I argue that it is
highly unlikely that textualists would in principle be able to refuse to
implement a codified economic substance doctrine, leaving us free to
look to other strengths and weaknesses of the competing codification
proposals.

44 There are

some indications, though, that Chirelstein and Zelenak are
concerned about the appeal to courts of the argument that "rules are rules"
irrespective of economic substance. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1940,
1946-47.
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A. The Textualist Challenge to Economic Substance

First, it is worth a paragraph or two to clarify what I mean by
"textualist." It is possible to describe a textualist broadly as any
interpreter who claims that the primary authoritative source of
meaning in a statute is its words. 45 But, in a modem era in which most
interpreters place a very high degree of importance on the words of a
46
statute, this definition is not very helpful to us in pinpointing just
those interpreters who tend to resist the economic substance doctrine.

For instance, some writers who might fall within this very broad
textualist umbrella claim that the import of words must be divined by
the meaning those words would have held at the time of the statute's

enactment,47 with some further disagreement about whether that
entails their public meaning,4 the meaning actually understood by the
statute's enactors,49 or the meaning that should reasonably be imputed
45 At first glance this definition might seem to include anyone who interprets

statutes. However, there are significant differences in how various schools of
interpretative thought believe the words of a statute relate to judicial applications of
the statute. John Manning, for example, distinguishes textualists from those who
would use legislative history as a way of authoritatively construing a statute's
meaning. John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to
Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1529 n.2 (2000) [hereinafter Manning,
Response to Siegel]. For Manning a key difference between authoritativemeaning and
other meanings is that authoritative meaning compels a court's reading, while other
sources of information about how to read a statute might merely be guides or hints.
See id. As I will explain shortly, this distinction is largely what divides those I
describe as textualists from those I label purposivists. Purposivists, in my taxonomy,
treat the words of the statute mostly as evidence about legislative purpose, rather
than as authoritative boundaries on a court's authority. Obviously, these are zones on
a continuum rather than bright lines. As the degree of deference one gives to a
source of evidence increases, it comes to look more and more like an authoritative
source. And, as the occasions for straying from authority's dictates grow in number,
the authority begins to seem more like mere evidence. Cf. John Manning, What
Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 75-76 (2006)
[hereinafter Manning, What Divides] (noting that so-called textualists and
purposivists both consider goals of legislation and context of statutes' words in
reaching a conclusion and that what divides them is what they "emphasize").
46 See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 348
(2005)
(stating that "no critic of textualism believes that statutory text is unimportant").
47 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of OriginalIntent in Statutory Construction,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 61 (1988).
48 See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132-33 (2003).
49 Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation,68
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to the enactors. Yet others we might call textualists assert that the
meaning of words in a statute is dynamic and should depend on the
understanding of the present-day audience or the judge who is
interpreting them." In practice, some of these species - especially
the dynamic interpreters - refuse to describe themselves as
textualists, even while they ostensibly acknowledge the supremacy of
the text.52 Not much is at stake for us in these terminological disputes.
With apologies, then, for overlooking what may be some

important but fine-grained distinctions, I will generally lump judges
into two categories: textualists and purposivists. Many of those whom
I call purposivists meet the very broad "textualist" standard of
assigning interpretive primacy to the text of a statute. But what I
mean here by purposivists are those who would utilize the words of

the text (and, conceivably, other sources, such as legislative history or
their own view of what is "reasonable") to construct a standard, rather
than a rule.53

They look at the words, ask "what is this statute

intended 54to accomplish?" and construe the terms in light of that
purpose.

At times they will place this purpose above the literal

words of a particular provision. Against this I set "textualists." In my
usage, a textualist is an interpreter who assigns the highest
TUL. L. REV. 803, 808-10 (1994).
.50See Caleb Nelson, A Response to ProfessorManning, 91 VA. L. REV.
451, 46466 (2005) (discussing role of canons as imputed meaning); Richard A. Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189-91 (1986); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation
- In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 810, 817 (1983).
But note that Posner describes himself in these pieces as quite receptive to nontextual
sources of evidence of the words' meaning, which would put his classification as a
textualist somewhat in doubt; in my simple schema he is mostly a purposivist. See
infra note 51.
51 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,
87 MICH. L.
REV. 20, 23 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 1479, 1497 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 56-71 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 309 (1989).
52 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 3, 29-35 (2006).
53 See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term - Foreword:
The Limits
of Socratic Deliberation,112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 19-20 n.74 (1998).
For a classic example, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
1374
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). For a leading tax scholar's
similar views, see Joseph Bankman, Stanford Professor Rebuts Criticisms of
PartnershipAntiabuse Reg., 94 TNT 140-33 (July 20, 1994).
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interpretive priority to the words of the statute, in their context. 55 The
textualist will resort to "purpose" inquiries only rarely, and even then,
usually only at a fairly low level of generality.56
Textualists, as I have described 1 7them, are likely to be hostile to

the economic substance doctrine.
The doctrine rejects literal
taxpayer interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code's (Code) rules
that run counter to a broad standard disfavoring tax planning for its
own sake.58 The textualist is unwilling to replace clear textual rules

with standards supposedly implicit in the statute.

Unsurprisingly,

then, as textualism has become more prevalent over the past two

decades, the doctrine has been subjected to ever-increasing skepticism
from textualist-minded courts. The Federal Court of Claims' opinion
in Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States 9 is typical. There, the trial

court found that the taxpayer satisfied the literal terms of the statute
and it rejected the Government's economic substance argument,
noting that "under constitutional separation of powers, judges should
determine congressional intent by the language of the Code, rather
than deciding what tax policy should be."
For good measure, the

court added a brief disquisition on the evils of judicial lawmaking,
emphasizing its effects on private planning - in effect, arguing that
E.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87-92, 99 (1991) (Scalia,
J.); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424
(2005); Nelson, supra note 50, at 467-68. Textualists may disagree on how broadly
they ought to look in locating the context of a phrase's meaning, with very broad
context perhaps tending towards purposivism. See George H. Taylor, Structural
Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 347, 350 (1995); Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies
of Interpretation,42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 607,618-22 (2005).
56 In other words, the textualist looks at "purpose"
primarily in order to
understand the meaning of particular words used in the statute - for example,
whether the word "rule" means "exert dominion over" or "demarcate with evenly
spaced lines." See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting); Manning, What Divides, supra note 45, at 91-96
(explaining that textualists prioritize "semantic" context while purposivists put more
weight on "policy" context); Nelson, supra note 50, at 463. The purposivist, in
contrast, may look to the more general intentions of Congress regarding how to apply
the statute in various contexts. For more thorough discussions, see, e.g., William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and the Application of Statutes, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 558, 572-74 (2000); Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616, 625-26 (1949).
" See Walsh, supra note 19, at 1545.
58 Bankman, supra note 1,
at 7-11.
-962 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004).
60 Id. at 753 (citing, inter alia, Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 544-45 (Scalia,
J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
5'
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statutes should be treated as embodying rules, not standards. 61

Interestingly, one other point the Coltec court mentions, without
real explanation, is that Congress has repeatedly considered but not
enacted a codification of the economic substance doctrine. 62
Evidently the court's implication is that Congress has affirmatively
chosen rules over standards. But that only begs a larger question:
supposing Congress were to codify the doctrine, would the Coltec
court, or any other textualist, give it any more heed?
This is a crucial question for would-be codifiers.
Other
commentators largely agree that, even if codification does little to

improve the content of the doctrine, at a minimum it is worthwhile to
the extent that it can force courts like the Coltec court to apply the
doctrine at all. These writers, too, seemingly overlook the point that
the rationale that drives courts to resist an uncodified doctrine might
apply fully to the doctrine codified. 63 If so, we have to find a way to

design a "fix" to the problem of unwanted tax planning that avoids
that rationale.
B. The Chirelsteinand Zelenak Solution and Why It May Be
Unnecessary
This, then, is another potential appeal of the Chirelstein and

Zelenak proposal. Again, rather than mandating that courts apply the
economic substance doctrine, they have for the most part simply
61 Id.

at 753-56.

The Federal Circuit later reversed the Court of Claims,
explaining that both its own precedent and Supreme Court precedent included cases
applying the economic substance doctrine. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). It is unclear how persuasive this second Coltec opinion
will prove to textualist-minded courts elsewhere. For one thing, the Federal Circuit
omits from its list of Supreme Court precedents one of the Court's most recent shelter
cases, a Justice Thomas-authored opinion in which the Court applied a very literal
reading of the statute and refused to consider purposive arguments arguably contrary
to its reading of the putatively "plain" language of the applicable statute. Gitlitz v.
Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206, 212-20 (2001). Second, the Supreme Court authority on
which the Federal Circuit relies for the proposition that textualism is not required by
the separation of powers in fact probably does not stand for that proposition. See
infra note 77.
62 Coltec, 62 Fed. Cl. at 756.
63 See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 6 (claiming that there is
"little doubt" Congress has the power to require that courts apply substance-overform rules); Zachary Nahass, Comment, Codifying the Economic Substance Doctrine:
A Proposal on the Doorstep of Usefulness, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 247, 264 (2006);
Weisbach, supra note 38, at 218-19 ("[S]tatutes and regulations can be changed in any
imaginable manner.").
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identified the most problematic transactions and set them off limits.
To the extent that we think that judicial resistance to the economic
substance doctrine, in any form, is a substantial obstacle, their
approach leapfrogs the obstacle nicely. The catch here is that, in fact,
there is no principled basis for extending the textualist opposition to
the (putatively) uncodified economic substance doctrine to an
encoded version. Whatever more pragmatic hesitation some courts
may have will, I hope, be undermined by a careful demonstration that
such hesitation cannot stand on principle. Thus, in this subsection I
ask whether the principles underlying textualism would require the
textualist to resist any legislative efforts to impose purposivist
methodology, as the codification of the economic substance doctrine
would do for all tax statutes.
Would Judge McKee or the Coltec trial court be obliged to apply
a codified doctrine? It seems plain enough, on a policy level, why
textualists would resist allowing textualist methods easily to be
defeasible by Congress. 64 Some textualists have argued, frankly, that
their goal is to limit the reach of government. 65 Textualism greatly
reduces Congress' power, not only by reducing the sweep of individual
statutes to their terms, but also by requiring frequent legislative
reconsideration of old enactments, inducing more careful deliberation
by Congress in anticipating how each enactment will be applied, and
raising the stakes for parties to any compromise. 66 Bargaining
becomes more extended and more intense because the outcome of the
negotiation will be more difficult to modify later. The result is that
S 67
more "space" is left for private ordering and market solutions.
Other textualists argue, relatedly, that textualism is more
"majoritarian," in the sense that rules made by courts can be effected
by a single litigant, while rules crafted by Congress, obviously, must
command widespread political support.68 Because of the difficulty of
64

See Walsh, supra note 19, at 1566-67.

65 E.g., Frank

H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation,17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 63 (1994).
66 Manning, Response to Siegel, supra note 45, at 1529, 1540 n.47; Muriel
Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
585, 593-615 (1994). At the same time, textualism may arguably increase the
importance of Congress relative to courts. But the point here is simply that both
courts and Congress generally can accomplish less under a textualist regime.
67 Frank H.

Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 549-50

(1983). But see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 94-100 (1991) (arguing that background rules left
in place by textualism are themselves legal rules, not market ordering).
68 See Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 536; Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 61-62.
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obtaining such broad agreement, many possible efforts at rulemaking
will fail, so that majoritarianism overlaps somewhat with the first,
libertarian purpose. But, in fairness, majoritarianism might have
other virtues. Many commentators believe that courts, in forcing
Congress to speak clearly to give effect to its dictates, also force
Congress to be more "republican" - that is, to debate among many
viewpoints, hopefully in a principled way - and to be more
"transparent" - that is, to make more evident to its constituents the
rules Congress has chosen for them. 69
Yet some of these same principles suggest that the textualist
would have to accept the "anti-textualist" statute, or on a smaller
scale, a codification of economic substance. If a goal of textualism is
to elevate the policy choices reached after a deliberative and
transparent process over those made by a small body of experts in an
obscure courthouse, then the textualist has little ground to assert that
her preference for textualism must prevail over the considered view of
the legislature.7 ° In a sense, the codified economic substance doctrine
is nothing more than a sort of "dictionary act" for the Code. The
doctrine defines - unobjectionably, one would think - what sorts of

transactions are truly those Congress wants to provide with favorable
tax treatment.7 The textualist should have to respect statutory text
that tells her how to read the rest of the statute.
On the other hand, there are some forms of decisions that we
generally think courts ought to make for themselves, even if contrary
to Congress' direction or definition. In other words, the textualist
might say that the "dictionary" part of the statute she is reading is
unconstitutional. While constitutional rights come quickly to mind, in
practice the Court often defers matters of constitutional dimension to
legislative determination - as, for example, with the scope of the
66
necessary
and proper" clause. 72 Therefore the textualist still would
69

See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE

L.J. 65, 73 (1983). On the transparency argument, see Finley v. United States, 490
U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 405, 416 (1989) (describing this view).
70 See Walsh, supra note 19, at 1567 (arguing that even Justice Scalia should have
to accept that Congress can impose standards instead of rules).
71 Cf. Brian J. Arnold, The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General AntiAvoidance Rule, 52 CAN. TAX. J. 488, 499 (2004) (making similar point with respect to
Canadian efforts to codify an anti-abuse rule for tax statutes); Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, FederalRules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 210309 (2002) (arguing that general interpretive rules supplied in statutes are theoretically
unobjectionable because no different than dictionary definitions).
n See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
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have two theoretical challenges in resisting codification of the doctrine
- first, to locate some source of constitutional authority for her
textualist resistance to the "dictionary" text, and second, some
additional ground for enforcing the Constitution - for elevating her
choice of interpretive method above the legislature's.
Professor Rosenkranz has suggested a similar analysis. He claims
that, for any individual statute, there would be little argument that
Congress cannot instruct a court how to read the terms of the statute.73
He acknowledges that the Constitution will often suggest a
background rule that will prevail in the absence of legislation, but for
the most part he argues that Congress can displace these
presumptions by statute in the same way it can displace any other
common law.74 However, he also notes that the Supreme Court's
cases seem to imply the existence of another category, which he terms
"constitutional default rules," in which the underlying constitutional
norm can be displaced only one statute at a time." He cites as an
example the Court's presumption that states cannot be sued in federal
court, a presumption that could not be displaced by a generic
definitional statute including "states" as "persons" for purposes of the
entire Code. 76 Rather, Congress can only subject states to suit under a
federal provision by expressly displacing state liability as to that
individual provision. Thus, we really have two sets of questions about
the constitutionality of any codification effort. First, whether it is
constitutional even if applied only to a single statute. And, second,
whether there is any sort of "constitutional default rule," like the
sovereign immunity clear statement rule, that would make it difficult
to codify economic substance across the whole of the Code at a single
stroke.
Turning first to whether codification could be permissible even in
a single statute, one common constitutional argument for textualism is
apparently that it is a necessary incident of the separation of powers.
Congress, it is claimed, makes laws, while courts should only interpret
them.77 Put in a more sophisticated frame, the claim is that the text of
ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217 (1978).
73 Rosenkranz, supra note 71, at 2103-09.
74

Id. at 2095-96.

75 Id. at 2097.

Id. at 2122-23.
7n See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 753-56 (2004);
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 9-13, 34-35 (Amy Gutmann
76
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a statute is the output of a negotiated legislative process and only by
applying that text fairly formally, can courts remain faithful to the
agreement embodied in the deal. 78 A group of negotiators, who may

arrive at consensus for many different reasons, has no "intention" to
which a court can be faithful, and so replacing the text with a meaning
derived from an imputed "intention," undermines legislative power.79

It is not immediately apparent how this theory would rule out
codification. As many critics have pointed out, legislative bodies can
reach (or agree not to reach) consensus on many different levels of
generality, so that the "deal" that is put into place can, in fact, be a
deal to defer rule-making authority to courts (as in, for example, the

Sherman Act).

A codified economic substance doctrine could be a

similar type of high-level agreement.

Moreover, all interpretation

ed., 1997); see also The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601,
at para. 41 (Can.); Arnold, supra note 71, at 499 (noting same arguments offered by
Canadian courts).
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument in the Coltec appeal, citing to a
Supreme Court opinion in which it claimed the Court had rejected a separation of
powers challenge to a purposive reading of a statute. Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)). I think the Federal Circuit probably
somewhat misread the continuing significance of Merrill Lynch. That was a case in
which the Court permitted suit under a so-called "implied" right of action - an
authorization for suit that was not expressed in the clear words of the federal statute
the plaintiffs were attempting to enforce. 456 U.S. at 375, 381. The modern rule for
private suits in federal court, however, is that in fact a claim exists only where there is
a clear statement authorizing a private suit. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
286-87 (2001). The Court has explained Merrill Lynch as simply embodying the
principle that, where Congress reenacts statutory language after a court (in retrospect,
erroneously) has implied a right of action under that language, Congress in effect has
expressly authorized suit. Id. at 288. The Court added that, when it comes to finding
private rights of action, "[w]e have never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn
of text" and that "legal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text." Id. While
perhaps this view of Merrill Lynch is a revisionist one, it is, obviously, authoritative.
Indeed, the private right of action caselaw may have been a uniquely bad example for
the Coltec court to have drawn on, since that area seems to reflect a strong textualist
influence. See Brian D. Galle, Can FederalAgencies Authorize Private Suits under
Section 1983? A TheoreticalApproach,69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 185 (2003).
78 See Easterbrook, supra note 65, at 68; Nelson, supra note
50, at 460-63;
Adrian Vermeule, InterpretiveChoice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 129-39 (2000).
79 See Molot, supra note 52,
at 28.
80 See Eskridge, supra note 56, at 572-74; Galle, supra note 77, at
183-86;
Rosenkranz, supra note 71, at 2115-20. I am omitting here the possibility that there
may be other limits on Congress' authority to delegate decision making power to
other actors, none of which seem to have much traction when it comes to delegations
to courts. See Rosenkranz, supra note 71, at 2126-39.
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includes some baseline assumptions about how text is to be
interpreted, such as the rules of grammar. As we saw, textualists
accept purposivism at this level - where it includes lexical context, if
not policy context. 81 Similarly, at least some textualists accept the
"absurd results" doctrine, which holds that a court can ignore even the
plain words of a text when the result is obviously not "right.",12 That
necessarily includes a recognition that statutes have purposes from
which the text can deviate. Once Congress has itself instructed a court
to engage in purposive analysis, and we have acknowledged (as in the
absurd results doctrine) that at least some contextual analysis is
permissible, it is hard to see how legislative supremacy or faithfulness
to the terms of a statutory "deal" can justify drawing a bright line on
the continuum of context beyond which courts cannot cross. Thus, the
separation of powers argument offered by the Coltec court does not
appear to rule out congressional efforts to require purposive
interpretation.
There may, though, be other constitutional bases on which the
Coltec court could have drawn. Surprisingly, although much has been
written about the constitutional provenance of textualism, there is
almost no scholarly examination of whether textualism as a method
can be displaced by Congress. The most extensive effort is a short
83
reply article by John Manning.
Professor Manning argues that
Congress could not enact a statute declaring that, for all future
statutes, courts must consider legislative history to have been
incorporated into the text of the statute. 84 His claim seems to be that
this arrangement violates separation of powers just as much as the use
of legislative history absent congressional authorization. In both
situations, he maintains, Congress improperly delegates law-making
power to a subsidiary within the legislative branch. 8 That argument
seems a bit circular, but we do not need to probe it closely here.
Manning states expressly that congressional delegations to other
branches, because they necessarily invite checks on legislative will by
the other governmental actors, are not constitutionally suspect in the
8'

See supra note 56.

See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); John Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 239192, 2419-20 (2003) ("[Elven the staunchest modern textualists still embrace and
apply, even if rarely, at least some version of the absurdity doctrine."). But see
Manning, supra,at 2391-92, 2419-20 (arguing that these other textualists are wrong).
83 Manning, Response to Siegel, supra note 45.
82

84
85

Id. at 1530-31.
Id. at 1533-35.
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way he condemns for legislative history. 86 That is the situation with
codification of the economic substance doctrine: it is not selfdelegation, but rather power-sharing between Congress and courts.
We can imagine, however, two more applicable approaches.
Consider the claim that "the judicial power" granted by Article III
itself does not include the authority to interpret federal statutes
except with regard to meaning clearly implicit on the face of the
81
statute. If we thought that Article III was limited in this way, then
codification could perhaps be unconstitutional. 88 John Manning has
argued that the original meaning of Article III curtails courts'
interpretive power, preventing them from relying much on legislative
history.89 But Manning acknowledges that his originalist analysis does
not do much else to confine courts. In his exchange with Professor
Eskridge, he admits that his reading would largely permit the
purposivist approach advocated by Eskridge, allowing judges to
consider the objects of legislation in interpreting its literal language. 9°
Another possible Article III argument might draw on the
literature of "clear statement rules." Scholars, in particular Larry
Sager, have argued that a number of constitutional terms are not
enforced directly by the courts, often out of deference to the superior
That is, Manning argues that by giving authoritative force to legislative
history, Congress would be, in effect, making law without bicameralism and
presentment. Id. at 1538-40. This, he says, would be unconstitutional in much the
same way that the single-house veto of administrative actions was unconstitutional in
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Manning, Response to Siegel, supra note 45, at
1535-37.
87 See Molot, supra note 52, at 7-9 (describing this
argument).
'8 That is, we might conclude that courts cannot accept a delegation to them of
authority to fill in gaps in the meaning or application of statutes. The Sherman Act,
therefore, would be unconstitutional under this view. I say "perhaps" with respect to
codification of economic substance because it is possible that our historical reading of
Article III might be inconclusive with respect to dictionary-type definitions. Where
the line demarcating acceptably "clear" statutory language from overly vague
definitions resides would be a thorny problem, as I discuss in the text a few
paragraphs from now.
89 John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,
101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (2001).
90 John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation
from the
Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1663 (2001); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., No
Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2051 (2006) (reviewing ADRIAN
86

VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL

INTERPRETATION (2006)); Molot, supra note 52, at 42, 45 (arguing that, other than

differing views on the use of legislative history, there is not much ground between
originalist constitutional claims by Manning and Eskridge).

2006]

Interpretative Theory

political accountability and practical policy-making skills of the other
branches.9 Instead, the courts demand that legislation that trenches
somewhat on the edges of the under-enforced value must be stated
"clearly" before it will be understood in fact to displace the
constitutional norm. The goal, as with textualism more generally, is to
make legislation more onerous to enact, but more deliberative and
transparent when enacted.92 Moreover, the end result is a set of rights
that is crafted not exclusively by courts, but by courts in cooperation
with the political branches, so that the courts' burden of rightselaboration is lightened by the contribution of political and practical
insight from the other branches. 93 For example, the Supreme Court
has determined that for the most part it will not strike down federal
legislation on the ground that it unduly expands federal power at the
expense of state autonomy - largely, again, because the Court defers
to the outcomes of the political process.94 But the Court does demand
that legislation affecting so-called "core" state functions must do so
clearly. 95 And so, in theory, when legislation displaces core state
functions, it does so after more elaborate consideration from both the
courts and Congress. 96
One could make a similar case for textualism more generally, or
at least, for textualism in the special context of tax legislation.
Scholars such as Randy Barnett have argued for a libertarian
originalist reading of the Constitution, in which the main goal of that
document is to preserve individual liberty from outsized government.97
Yet as Barnett's critics point out, we have already walked that road in
the Lochner era, with the result that courts often made haphazard,
uninformed, and anti-democratic decisions that undermined, nearly
98
fatally, their public support.
If we agree with Barnett (and this
91 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Congress as ConstitutionalDecisionmaker
and Its Power
to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 104-05 (1986); Sager, supra note 72,
at 1217.
92 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 631 (1992);
William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND.
L.J. 865, 881 (1993).
93 Popkin, supra note 92, at
881.
94 E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
547-48 (1985).
95 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-61
(1991).
96 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 92, at 624.
97 RANDY

E.

BARNETT,

RESTORING

THE

LOST

CONSTITUTION:

THE

PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).

98 E.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner's Loss: Randy Barnett's Case
for a Libertarian Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT,
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author does not) about his claims as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, then his libertarian principle would seem to be a strong
candidate for the sort of "under-enforced" legal norm that Sager
discusses. 99 In this view, the libertarian principle would seem right as

a matter of first-order constitutional interpretation, but unworkable in
practice. And that, in turn, could lead us to textualism. By raising the
cost of legislation, we could protect somewhat libertarian values

without outright prohibiting government regulation to the degree of
the Lochner Court. Alternatively, if this seems to paint with too
broad a brush, we might agree with Learned Hand that there is a sort

of tax exceptionalism'0

-

that there is some basic right to tax

planning, to preserve private assets against state claims, and therefore,

that efforts to restrain tax planning should have to overcome the
"clear statement" speedbump.
But even these theories, as radical as they may seem, would not of

themselves bar codification of the economic substance doctrine.
Codification, after all, is in a sense exactly the response that the

theory of the clear statement rule hopes to produce. After courts
have resisted implementing implicit legislative goals that seemed to
approach a protected area, Congress responds by affirming more

clearly that it intends to press on.
At most, then, these approaches might justify describing
textualism as one of Professor Rosenkranz's constitutional
presumptions or default rules. Of course, whether textualism should
be properly considered a presumption or a default rule is highly
significant to our present debate. If textualism, or tax planning
freedom, is only a presumption, then codification of the economic
substance doctrine clearly satisfies its requirements.10 1 On the other
supra note 97).
99 See Sager, supra note
72.

100Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). The court stated:
We agree with the Board and the taxpayer that a transaction, otherwise
within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is
actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one
may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not
bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.
Id. at 810. Of course, the Second Circuit went on to conclude that, irrespective of any
such fight, Congress' purpose in enacting a tax statute must prevail over its literal
terms. Id. at 810-11.
"o See Rosenkranz, supra note 71, at 2096-98 (explaining that Congress may
freely change a presumption or "constitutional starting point").
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hand, if it is a "default rule" which therefore can be displaced by
Congress only on a statute-by-statute basis, we then have a very
difficult determination. The codified doctrine, of course, applies not
simply to one statute, but it is also not quite so broad as the entire
Code. Just how narrowly or broadly can a default-displacing
provision sweep at a single stroke?
Rosenkranz's article, as thoughtful as it is, leaves these kinds of
questions largely unanswered. He does not offer any normative
theory of how to distinguish presumptions from defaults, instead only
observing that the Supreme Court seems tc have treated state liability
to private suit as the latter. This is hardly a fault of Rosenkranz.
What he is talking about, really, is the theory of under-enforced
constitutional rights and the corresponding statutory rules of
constitutional avoidance that go with them. But the Court itself has
never developed any coherent theory addressing the extent of
Congress' power to deprive courts of the avoidance power. I have
noted similar uncertainties about avoidance before. For example, no
one knows whether state legislatures could order state courts not to
employ avoidance when interpreting either state or federal law. 1°2
And, on the question of how broad a default-displacing statute may
be, I have described the Supreme Court's own confusion over that
question in the context of clear statement rules that protect state
sovereign prerogatives. 03
These doctrinal uncertainties may well be deliberate. Fuzzy
borders around our rules may keep potential trespassers - here,
Congress - far from their edges. °4 And the very premise of the
notion of avoidance is that it minimizes the Court's need to confront
Congress and strike down the enactments of the more politically
responsive branch.' 5 A very brightly demarcated definition of what
Congress is permitted to do might oblige the Court to challenge
Congress head-on much more often,' °6 diminishing the Court's own
store of political capital and good will. And it removes some of the
Court's doctrinal flexibility. Right now, the Court can require more
102

Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with

Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155,

210 (2004).
103 Id. at 162-66.
'04 See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SuP. CT. REV. 71,137.
'0' Galle, supra note 102, at 204-05.
106 See Molot, supra note 52, at 54-55 (arguing that consistent application
of
strong textualist methods tends to greatly expand judicial power).
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or less narrow default-removing legislation, depending on its own
sense of how important the underlying right is, how likely Congress is
to respect the right, the Court's own present capacity for resisting
encroachments, and other similar factors.'0 7 A hard and fast rule
would likely make those adjustments either very difficult or, at least,
much closer to the surface of the Court's opinions than it seems
presently to want to make them. 0 8 So the space between default and
presumption may well never be clearly set out - by design.
For our present purposes, then, the certainty of uncertainty may
be all we need. It may be enough to say simply that it would take a
dramatic new advance in the law of clear statement rules to invalidate
codification of the economic substance doctrine and no such dramatic
advance is likely to be forthcoming. It therefore seems, at most, a
very small advantage in favor of Chirelstein and Zelenak that their
proposal would avoid this possible problem. Further, even if there
were a rule that very broad anti-clear-statement-rule statutes are
impermissible, it is unclear where the line would fall dividing those
that would be permissible and those that would not be. The economic
substance doctrine is fairly broad, but corporate tax planning is a
small piece of the legislative world as a whole. So, in short, there
appears to be very little reason to fear that textualists would have any
constitutional hook for resisting codification.
IV. TEXTUALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF INTENDED TAX SUBSIDIES

I do not say any of this in order to criticize Chirelstein and
Zelenak. Indeed, as I mentioned, my argument here relies on their
powerful insight: that an express listing of approved or disapproved
transactions has the potential to solve one of the largest conceptual
challenges for the economic substance doctrine.'9 In particular, a
'07

Cf. Popkin, supra note 92, at 882-84 (pointing out that constitutionally-

inspired clear-statement rules leave to judges additional decisions about how broadly
to apply underlying constitutional principle).
108 In addition, for reasons that are too complex to be worth getting into here,
the
Court likely has strong institutional reasons for wanting, rhetorically, to describe its
interpretation of statutes, even under the aegis of a constitutional "default rule," as
something other than constitutional deliberations. See Brian Galle, The Justice of
Administration: Judicial Responses to Executive Claims of Independent Authority to
Interpretthe Constitution, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 157, 194-208 (2005). But describing
its work as constitutional interpretation is precisely what the Court would likely have
to do in order to enunciate any clear theory of constitutional default rules. Thus, I
think we are unlikely to ever see such a theory, at least from the Court.
109 Cf Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1955-56.
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major flaw in the doctrine is and has been that some tax benefits in
fact are intended by Congress. Leaving to courts the task of sorting
tax shelter from tax subsidy exposes the whole enterprise to precisely

the most trenchant criticisms of textualism. In this part, I explain
those criticisms and discuss how (I hope) incorporating this piece of
the Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal into any codification effort
blunts them. At the same time, we see that, if an unfettered judiciary

is our largest concern, this opt-in or opt-out scheme is enough on its
own to solve the problem without resorting to outright abandonment
of economic substance.
A. A ClearStatement Rule for Tax Benefits or Detriments
Despite the possible downsides of tax planning, it is obvious that
Congress sometimes intends to encourage it." ° Tax subsidies may
correct a defective market, as where individual actors fail to
internalize fully the benefits of a societal good."' Or the tax system

may simply provide an easily administered delivery vehicle for
redistributive spending of various forms (not all of them laudable)." 2
Yet Congress does not have infinite time and energy to write every
tax statute in a way that perfectly exemplifies the policy tradeoffs
Congress wants to achieve." 3 And, of course, Congress cannot always
foresee what effect a statutory text will have when mixed with realworld financial transactions, some unimagined at the time of
drafting.1 4 Ideally, then, Congress would like a shortcut, a way to
statutes are
enable courts readily to identify what portions of their
5
not.''
are
portions
what
and
subsidies
designed to create
1o See Bankman, supra note 1, at 13; Beller, supra note 33, at 5-6; see also The
Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at paras. 16, 32 (Can.)
(making same arguments with respect to Canadian Parliament).
"' See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a CharitableContributions Deduction, 74
VA. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (1988).
12 PHILIP D. OLIVER, TAX POLICY: READINGS AND MATERIALS
569-84 (2d ed.
2004).
113

See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 55-56; David A. Weisbach,

Formalismin the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 861-62 (1999).
114 See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New
Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135,141 (2002); David P. Hariton, Response to "Old 'Brine' in
New Bottles" (New Brine in Old Bottles), 55 TAX L. REV. 397, 397-98 (2002).
115 Louis Kaplow has argued that, in choosing between statutes whose details will
be filled out primarily at the time of enactment (rules) and those whose content will
largely be created in litigation afterwards (standards), the tax law should choose rules
because the costs of many repeated instances of litigation will exceed the costs of one
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This reality poses a particular problem for those who wish to
control tax sheltering activity in a textualist era. Remember, again,
that the textualists' primary complaint is with the effect of shifting
decision-making authority from legislatures to courts.1 6 That shift,
they say, means that rules may be made largely out of public sight and
insulated from public influence. n 7 Changes can be initiated by a single

litigant with an agreeable court. And rules may reflect, not
widespread consensus by representatives of various social interests,
but instead the preferences of an elite and entrenched group of judges
whose preferences may be either eclectic or not fully informed. 18 The
textualist might, conceivably, be willing to accept a statutory scheme

that stated, flatly, that tax planning is prohibited. That would leave
little play for judicial discretion. What most present codification
proposals instead present is a mixed landscape, in which a court is

burst of legislative energy. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 577 (1992). Thus, Kaplow would likely say that Congress,
if it is interested in efficiency, should not prefer "shortcuts," as I have called them.
One could argue with Kaplow's assessment of the welfare effects of rules. For
instance, he is largely comparing apples and oranges, treating legislative decision
making resources as equivalent to the resources we spend in litigation. But one of
those - litigation resources - is relatively limitless, while legislative resources may
be significantly constrained by the Constitution. We can only have so many
legislators and there may be serious negative effects on the quality of legislative
outputs if we cut back on the time legislators themselves (as opposed to their staffs)
devote to each statute. A complete welfarist analysis would have to consider whether
Congress could create net positive welfare by conserving its own time and allocating
budget authority for more judges.
My point here, though, is a bit different. I am claiming that congressmen
themselves are likely to want to conserve their own time. For instance, they will only
partly internalize any of the inefficiency effects predicted by Kaplow (largely through
the medium of voter discontent with the job they are doing), while more fully
realizing the benefits of having time to raise money, provide constituent services, and
enact legislation that serves their own ideological and political interests. That
preference has significant implications for interpretative theory. If our goal is fidelity
to congressional intent, however self-serving, then we likely have to follow Congress'
preference for standards in some instances. If our goal, on the other hand, is to
reform a misguided Congress and chasten it to better internalize what may be harmful
effects of its preferences, then we have to understand the basis for those preferences.
Either way, the basic point that Congress likely wants shortcuts is important.
116 See Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 536; Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 61-62.
17 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.); Sunstein, supra
note 69, at 416 (describing this view).
118 See The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., [20051 2
S.C.R. 601, at paras.
31, 41 (Can.); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 79-80, 105-18, 136-38,
141 (1999).
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expected to sort between encouraged tax subsidies, discouraged tax
planning, and tax shelters, which are to be singled out for special
penalties. All of this sorting is to be done based on the court's own
view of what a Congress, which on the face of the Code has given few
clues, must have wanted. The result is an obvious invitation to give
free play to the courts' own views about what conduct is desirable and
whether revenue is to be given priority over private autonomy.
Therefore the textualist likely is unsurprised that individual circuit
courts show distinct, ideologically predictable tendencies in their
treatment of alleged tax shelters. 1 9
Even if we are unmoved by these criticisms, their appeal to some
judges remains a practical problem, as the experiences of our
The JCT's proposal
Canadian neighbors have demonstrated.' 20
includes an exception for tax benefits intended by Congress.12 ' The
textualist response, in the Canadian example, is logical: the textualist
exploits this language to upend the enterprise, reading intended by
Congress to mean any benefit described by the literal language of the
122
The exception swallows the rule and the textualist need
Code.
worry no longer about judicial discretion.' 23
Chirelstein and Zelenak themselves seem to make much the same
point. They worry that any effort to leave "economic substance" or
more general anti-abuse rules to judges will simply reproduce the
preferences, rather than reflect a rational nationwide
judge's policy
i. 124
They thus appear to share with textualists some
policy.
tax
skepticism about the capacity for individual judges to fill statutory
''gaps" in a way that is principled and faithful to abstract congressional
policy aims not embodied specifically in the lexical dimension of a
statute. This is, of course, not an undisputed position in interpretative

119

See Hariton, supra note 23, at 23-24; Nahass, supra note 63, at 257-61;

Sheppard, supra note 13, at 1022.
120 In essence, the Canadian experience was that enactment of a statutory rule
aimed at abusive tax shelters did almost nothing to change judicial outcomes.
Canadian courts essentially ignored the new statute and continued to read tax laws as
they always had - as textualists. See The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co.,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at paras. 60-76 (Can.); Arnold, supra note 71, at 491-92, 497.
121 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 14-15.
The Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, at paras. 6076 (Can.).
123 See Schler, supra note 8, at 386-87.
124 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1949, 1953; Zelenak, supra note
122

39, at 185-87.
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circles. Professor Dworkin, among many others, would be anxious to
disagree.'25
But, again, our goal is to build a statute that will prove effective
no matter the interpretative theory of the court in which it lands.
Dworkin's Hercules, and his brethren, will have no trouble sorting
congressionally intended subsidies from tax sheltering and will trust
their fellow principled judges to do the same.' 26 That achieves nicely
the "shortcut" I mentioned at the outset of this section, conserving
Congress' tax statute drafting efforts and freeing more time for other
problems.
Unfortunately, for those who are unpersuaded by
purposivism, we have some more work to do. "Do what Congress
intends" will not be a satisfactory shortcut, and a Congress that relies
on that rule alone, may see unintended and unappealing results, such
as allowance of many tax shelters.
Evidently, then, we need a more precise way of describing the
difference between tax subsidy and tax shelter. This is as much a
conceptual challenge as a linguistic one. Consider, for instance, the
participation by nonprofit entities in many "shelters" in exchange for
a modest accommodation fee. The tax exemption is obviously
"intended" by Congress to benefit the exempt entity. Here, the
accommodation fee does, indeed, leverage exemption to the entity's
gain. But that gain is achieved at a disproportionately large social
cost. To us, it may seem irrational to spend $100 to give the exempt
entity $1. The textualist might say, however, that to allow courts to
make that judgment is to open the door to saying that many other
congressional subsidies are just as foolish.
Once this door is open, the textualist claims, it is hard to make
certain that only the "right" subsidies step through. In this view, the
difficulty in describing the limits of what it means to subsidize is that
the societal tradeoffs that go into a political decision to subsidize are
often necessarily implicit or incompletely theorized. We have little
language, and not much more theory, about what it means for a
collective body, be it a legislature or a society, to "intend"
something. 117 Judicial efforts to fill in these gaps may be subjective
125 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 87, 176-275,353-54 (1986).
126 Hercules is Professor Dworkin's imaginary judge, whose

considerable
knowledge and analytical powers allow him to reach right answers even to difficult
legal questions. Id. at 239.
127 See Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 547; Manning, supra
note 55, at 427; Molot,
supra note 52, at 28; Nelson, supra note 46, at 370; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative
History and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory
Interpretation,76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1300-01 (1990).
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Inevitably, then, some decisions will permit tax benefits
guesswork.
to flow to transactions that many or most legislators would have

agreed should not receive them, but which perhaps are viewed more
sanguinely by a judge. 129

As a result, it is difficult to describe

"intended subsidy" in a way that rules out shelter hitchhikers, unless
we think words can have only one plausible lexical meaning and we
limit statutory "intent" to that meaning.
Chirelstein and Zelenak helpfully suggest a way to short-circuit

these problems. If we simply make a list of expressly approved tax
subsidies, or of disapproved shelters, then we can greatly reduce our
need to describe congressional intent on the level of grand theory."3

That is, in this scheme any tax benefit can be recognized only if
described on the face of a statute (or, perhaps, a regulation) as an
intended tax benefit; intention could not be inferred from context,
We then would have only the more
implication, or analogy.
manageable and more familiar task of making the lines demarcating
each carve-out as bright as we want them. Obviously there will still be
debate around the edges. But we greatly reduce the room for the play
of judicial value preferences, which greatly appeases textualist
resistors."'
Now, as I noted earlier, this approach has costs, at least from the
legislative perspective. It consumes large chunks of legislative time
128
121

See Easterbrook, supra note 65, at 68; Nelson, supra note 46, at 370.
See Schler, supra note 8, at 340-41; Walsh, supra note 19, at 1562-63; cf

ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF

LEGAL INTERPRETATION 175-76 (2006) (arguing that error costs of judicial
interpretation exceed any benefits); Smith, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting difficulty of
sorting benefits intended by Congress from those that resemble benefits intended by
Congress).
130 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra
note 9, at 1955-56.
131 Cf Weisbach, supra note 113, at 877 (observing
that it might be possible to
obtain benefits of both rules and standards by "provid[ing] a standard with safe
harbors"). As Ethan Yale points out in correspondence, this standard arguably does
raise a second set of difficulties in identifying what is a tax "benefit" that must be
staked out expressly by Congress and what is simply an ordinary application of tax
principles. For instance, we might dispute whether a "beneficial" treatment of basis
in fact is a "benefit" that must be stated clearly by Congress or just a necessary
component of determining a taxpayer's income. Cf. George Cooper, The Taming of
the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
657, 659-60.(1985) (observing difficult baseline questions in defining tax avoidance).
To avoid these difficulties, I would suggest that we might define our baseline from
which departures are a "benefit" not as "income," or any other concept that might
involve questions of tax policy, but rather simply as any determination that would
reduce taxable income below gross revenues in the applicable tax accounting period.
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that could be devoted to other efforts, as Congress must determine
each item individually, and craft and agree on language that reflects
its assumptions. For example, Congress would have to state whether
tax exemption applies only to income generated by engaging in
exempt activities, and not to the profits
passed through by a
. 13 2
partnership created by a shelter promoter.
It must reach consensus
on these questions and cannot simply punt them to courts. 3 3 Some of
these negotiations will entail not only time but also political pain, as it
becomes more obvious to those whose oxes are gored who has done
the goring. Many efforts will initially be over- or under-inclusive and
demand repeated revisions, especially as underlying facts in the world
change.' 34 To the textualist, of course, these are not costs at all, but
gains. They are precisely what textualism is supposed to produce more deliberation, more transparency, and less legislation.
In sum, Chirelstein and Zelenak, although they do not frame their
plan in quite this way, offer us a solution to what would otherwise be a
crippling problem. Many views of interpretative theory would force
the interpreter to balk at allowing judges to sort shelter from subsidy.
Yet, unless Congress is to write every line of the Code with the utmost
care and inhuman foresight, judges will be called upon to sort. The
default rule device lifts much of the weight of those sorting decisions
from the court - although, of course, not all of it. 3' Congress then
can conserve its efforts, giving ordinary attention to most tax statutes
and devoting heightened thought and deliberation to the rules
affecting "opt-in" or "opt-out" provisions that are especially
important to it. And these default provisions, by virtue of being
interpretatively palatable to many different judges, are more likely to
be heeded.
B. Why Stop There?
A key aspect of the analysis in the last section is that it does not
seem to depend on the structure of the background anti-shelter rule.

132

See Surrey, supra note 39, at 707 n.31.

133See WALDRON, supra note 118, at 80.
134 I note that a classic solution for many of these problems is to allow agencies
to

fill in the gaps and make the fine-grained adjustments that better implement an
imperfect statute. This solution would reduce error costs, but arguably also reduce
transparency. This article is agnostic about whether the Service would have the
power to alter or authoritatively interpret the list of intended tax subsidies.
135 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default
Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2040-48 (2002).
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Chirelstein and Zelenak deploy their opt-in/opt-out idea as a way to
permit some but not all transactions with no real economic loss to get
beneficial tax treatment, without having to retreat from their stance
that courts should not be obliged to guess at congressional intent. But
there is no obvious reason why the same idea would not work even in
the absence of their suggested bright-line rule prohibiting deductions
in the absence of real economic losses.
Indeed, the opt-in/opt-out plan might make the economic
substance doctrine, or other broad anti-abuse rules, more appealing
than the Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal as a whole. Suppose our
primary concerns about the economic substance doctrine were tied to
judicial reluctance to employ it, rather than to any doubts about its
content. 1 6 We might then enact a codified doctrine that directs courts
to disallow tax benefits for a transaction that lacks economic
substance, unless that transaction was specifically identified by
Congress as one that should receive favorable treatment. For courts
that would be reluctant to punish shelter activity, that rule - the optin rule - deprives them of the argument that the literal text of the
statute (text that does not contain an express declaration that this
form of transaction is intended for subsidy) exemplifies an implicit
congressional "intention" to allow the taxpayer a deduction or other
benefit.
And, perhaps more importantly, we have enacted an
economic substance "standard" in a way that is intellectually satisfying
to judges across the spectrum of interpretative theory.
Thus, assuming that the economic substance doctrine itself is
fairly determinate, the result is to remove much of the wiggle room for
importing judicial notions of good tax policy. That was one of the
central goals we identified for Chirelstein and Zelenak's proposal.
But we have achieved it across a much wider, and more malleable,
range of possible abusive transactions. Our only remaining challenge
is to find a formulation of the economic substance doctrine that
justifies our assumption. I return to that problem in a moment.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTENT OF A CODIFIED DOCTRINE

My analysis so far has two main implications. First, interpretative
theory shows us that there are good reasons for codifying the
136

In other words, in this hypothetical, we are reasonably confident that it will

usually be obvious when a transaction has economic substance and when it does not.
I use the subjunctive voice in the text here because I recognize that this is an
assumption contrary to fact; one of our big worries about the doctrine is that its
content is sometimes hard to predict. I return to this problem shortly.
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economic substance doctrine. Codification could overcome the
reservations of textualist judges. It would also allow Congress the
opportunity to enact a default rule that would deal with some of the
policy objections of textualists, while preserving Congress' flexibility
in drafting most portions of the Code. In this part, I want to develop
another implication: there is a good argument that the preceding
suggests not only a form for the economic substance doctrine but also
its content. In particular, by using clear statement rules, we can
remove what is probably the most persuasive argument against David
Weisbach's suggestion that shelter regulation should aim to curtail all
tax planning. 137 That, in turn, suggests that any codified doctrine
should likely target transactions subjectively motivated in significant
part by tax considerations.
A. In Favor of a Strong Conjunctive Test

A continuing source of debate among courts is whether the
economic substance test has both objective and subjective
components. That is, while some courts say that the test can be
satisfied either by the presence of objective economic substance or a
subjective business purpose for engaging in the transaction, others
require both. 138 The most recent codification proposals from both the
Senate and the JCT would require a "conjunctive" test - that is, they
would require both. 13 What is unclear is why. Our discussion in Part
IV, in combination with important work by others, suggests a strong
reason for requiring that taxpayers receive favorable tax treatment
only for transactions in which their main objective is a nontax
purpose.
As I said, I believe my analysis in Part IV fills a hole in what
otherwise is a highly convincing set of claims -by
David Weisbach
• 140
about the ideal content of tax shelter regulations.
Since he has
already laid his argument out in detail, I only summarize it here.
Weisbach's argument, as I read it, proceeds from the fairly
uncontroversial premise that the content of any shelter strategy
should follow from its purposes. 14'
From a purely welfarist
perspective, the primary goals of the tax system are to raise revenue
for government while incurring a minimum of economic distortions
137 Weisbach, supra note 38, at 222-25.
138 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note
19
140

See supra note 13.
Weisbach, supra note 38.

141 Id. at

222.

14, at 6-7.
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that reduce society's productivity. 42 Both of these goals are best
served by a tax system that discourages "tax planning" - that is,
143
arranging one's affairs so as to minimize tax burdens.
While the effects of tax planning on revenue are obvious, its
downside for social welfare perhaps bears a bit more examination.
Most obviously, tax incentives distort efficient market behavior and
tax planning distracts the planners from doing something more
productive with their time.'"
I would add that inefficient tax
distortions can be magnified by social norms and QWERTY effects.
That is, sometimes we act the way we do because that is how we
conclude we are expected to behave145 or because we have invested in
a way that depends on existing arrangements. 46 So distortions caused
initially by a tax effect can influence behavior even generations later
or in industries not affected directly by the tax. The costs of these
distortions are almost literally incalculable.
It follows from these premises that at least the ideal goal of antishelter regulations should be to curtail tax planning.1 47 That is, we
should not simply aim to prevent revenue losses. We also should

' Id. at 234, 241; Weisbach, supra note 113, at 870. I put aside fairness
considerations here mostly because in the shelter context they often are questionbegging. For instance, we all probably agree that similarly situated taxpayers should
have comparable duties to pay tax, but that simply frames a further debate about
whether merely technical compliance with the Internal Revenue Code (Code) puts a
taxpayer in the same position as one who complies in both the technical and some
other sense.
143 Weisbach, supra note 38, at 223-25.
My analysis here presumes that
Congress, as an entity that more nearly internalizes society-wide costs and benefits
than any individual private actor, will be a better judge of efficient or fairly
distributive rules than potential tax avoiders. In other words, I assume that it is
unlikely that tax rules will themselves be inefficient in a way that could be mitigated
by tax planning.
144 See id. at 222-23, 232, 236; Thompson, supra note 25, at 782.
145 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 539-40 (1998); Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory,
J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 99, 99-100.
146 See W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990,
at 92, 95; Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
332, 332 (1985); Paul Krugman, History and Industry Location: The Case of the
Manufacturing Belt, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 80, 80 (1991). This effect may be increased
by cognitive biases in favor of existing arrangements. See James A. Fanto, QuasiRationality in Action: A Study of PsychologicalFactors in Merger Decision-Making,62
OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1360 (2001).
147 Except, of course, for tax planning that would in fact increase revenue,
social
welfare, or both. More on this in a moment.
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attempt to discourage socially wasteful efforts to minimize tax. 148
Because of a long tradition
of rhetoric in favor of a taxpayer's "right"
••
149
to engage in tax planning, it perhaps is fair to say that most antishelter efforts have focused on the revenue side, with at most only
incidental attention to whether they will also affect tax planning.
Taking this analysis one step further, we might conclude that any
codification of the economic substance doctrine should prohibit
favorable treatment for transactions motivated in any large part by tax
considerations. 5 0 That rule aims most directly at both of the problems
we want to prevent and reaches them in ways that a purely objective
test might not. For example, markets improve and react through
experimentation, and there may be many objectively reasonable ways
to do business. If businesses select among what look at present to be
relatively interchangeable options based on tax considerations rather
than out of an effort to improve, we lose much of the motor that
drives business experimentation and reduce market adaptability.
There are two main sets of arguments against this reasoning. The
first is that there are putatively insurmountable evidentiary problems
in establishing subjective motivation."' In many respects, though,
requiring subjective business purpose in every case will make the
Government's life easier. Evidence that a taxpayer bought a
promoted tax shelter will likely amount to conclusive proof that the
tax benefit should be disallowed - because, among other reasons,
most fact-finders probably will conclude it is unlikely that the
promoted tax shelter happened to be just the kind of investment
vehicle for which the taxpayer was looking."' While some taxpayers
may invent documents to support bogus business purposes, the
possibility of "smoking gun" e-mails that will foreclose any business
purpose argument (plus the threat of convictions for obstruction of
justice) may outweigh this danger in the long run.153 And making
taxpayer motive relevant in every case will give taxpayers a strong
148

See Weisbach, supra note 38, at 252.

149 See Hariton, supra note 23, at 7; Weisbach, supra note 38, at 220 (describing

the tradition).
150 See Weisbach, supra note 38, at 251-53.
151 Cf. Bankman, supra note 1, at 27-28 (considering whether it is difficult for

taxpayers to create fake evidence of nontax subjective intent); Weisbach, supra note
38, at 236-37, 253 (noting that determining motive may be costly).
152 Cf. Weisbach, supra note 38, at 253 (arguing that it is obvious that several
famous shelters were tax-motivated).
153 See I.R.C. § 7212(a) (making any corrupt effort to "impede[] the due
administration of" the Code a felony).
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incentive to be as transparent as possible with the Service about their
tax position, because any evidence of concealment could easily be
read by a finder of fact as evidence of tax planning.
In any event,

the burden of proof critique is, at most, an argument for the Service
and the Justice Department to be choosy about in which cases they
elect to proceed. The law has both norming and deterrence effects'55
and may thereby curb subjectively motivated shelter activity even if
enforced as such only rarely.
The more potent critique, then, is that some tax planning is
desirable. Michael Schler and others, in their various responses to

Weisbach and elsewhere, raise what is for us now a familiar problem:
there are some tax rules designed specifically to encourage behavior
117
that might not result from an unregulated market.
But that is no
reason to welcome all tax planning. The challenge is to find a reliable
and administrable tool for sorting desirable from undesirable
planning. As we have seen, the challenge is substantial; the price of
failure is a potential for highly over- or under-inclusive enforcement.
However, as we have also seen, a clear statement rule for intended tax
benefits could well be the tool we need to mitigate those problems.5 8
See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499-500 (1943).
See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349, 361-65 (1997); Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of
Punishment,56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1182-83 (2004). But cf Robert Weisberg, Norms
and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 467 (2003) (critiquing strong predictive claims of other analyses of
effect of law and punishment on social norms).
156 See Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation
Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 957 (2006); Weisbach, supra
note 38, at 245.
157 See Beller, supra note 33, at 5; Hariton, supra note 23, at
15, 20; Joseph
Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 876
(1982); McMahon, supra note 20, at 205-06; James M. Peaslee, More Thoughts on
Proposed Economic Substance Clarification,99 TAx NOTEs 747 (May 5, 2003); Schler,
supra note 8, at 329, 340, 385-86 (arguing that Weisbach overlooks that some tax
planning is encouraged by Congress); see also Bankman, supra note 1, at 13
(observing that the economic substance doctrine cannot logically be applied to
subsidies intended by Congress); Daniel N. Shaviro, Evaluating the Social Costs of
Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REV. 445, 450-51 (2002) (positing that tax planning
to comply even with arbitrary tax rules may have some societal usefulness).
1.8 See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
154
155

David Hariton also argues that Weisbach confuses the tax shelter issue by failing
to suggest a yardstick for distinguishing between unwanted tax planning and truly
egregious planning meriting some additional penalty. Hariton, supra note 23, at 6-8,
32. In a sense, this is true. Once we are willing to say that we should resist all tax
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For example, Congress could carve out a list of expressly specified
tax-favored transactions that would be exempt from recharacterization even if engaged in unreasonably or for tax-avoidance
purposes.
Thus, with the addition of a clear-statement rule addendum, there
seems to be no strong argument against a codified doctrine that
condemns subjectively tax-motivated transactions.
B. In or Out? An Aside

This presents the additional question whether the default setting
for our clear statement rule should be subsidy or no subsidy. The
logic of clear statement rules suggests that we should put the burden
of overcoming legislative inertia on the position we think presently is
over-produced, or at least under-deliberated, in the legislative
process. 9 For the most part, I have argued, tax planning is societally
wasteful. Yet there are few checks on tax subsidies, especially largely
hidden subsidies, such as special rules for accelerated depreciation
and deferred or equity-based compensation. Interest groups may use
the tax system, which is arcane and largely obscure from public sight
to begin with, as a way to hide from voters at large the benefits for
which they lobby and reap for themselves.' 6° Public choice theory
predicts that, in situations like that, the interest group will win more
often than the political marketplace would otherwise dictate;
information costs and other collective action barriers, magnified by
manipulation of obscure tax provisions, result in rents for the interest
161
group.
This is not to say that tax subsidies are always pernicious and
inefficient. But there does seem to be a plausible case that they are
over-produced and would greatly benefit from a rule that makes their
production not only more difficult, but also more transparent, so that
the political market can operate itself to check them more effectively.

planning, it becomes difficult to single out some subset of it that we find especially
worthy of condemnation. That problem is easy to avoid, simply by exposing all tax
planning to the same risks.
159

Galle, supra note 102, at 184-85.

160

See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget

Processand the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOzO L. REV. 871, 930-31 (1999).
161 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS

AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 21, 35 (1971); Jonathan R. Macy, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223,229 (1986).
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The "opt-in" default rule I have described helps us to move in that

direction.
C. Back to Standards
We are left with one loose end, albeit a very significant one. It is

one thing, in theory, to recognize that we ought to target subjective
tax planning motivations. It is another to determine whether as a
practical matter any judicially-administered system with that goal can
be consistent and predictable enough to be worth its costs. For
example, as I have noted, one major reason Chirelstein and Zelenak

are disenchanted with the economic substance doctrine is that they do
not think that it can deter determined tax avoiders. 162 If we agreed
with that view, we might prefer their bright-line technique as a
second-best method for reaching inefficient tax planning. As I explain
here, though, the evidence for their claim is, at best, uncertain.
More or less everyone who has ever written about the economic

substance doctrine has a different view about its deterrent effects on
taxpayers. Chirelstein and Zelenak, as I said, believe that very
aggressive tax planners, and especially their clients, can be dissuaded
from their enterprise only by a bright-line rule that leaves essentially
no doubt that the transaction available to them will not work. 16' At
162 See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1948, 1953.

See id. It would be interesting to know whether Chirelstein and Zelenak
agree with the Government that the KPMG shelter promoters are criminally liable
for promoting their "FLIP" and "BLIPS." The Government's theory of the case,
according to the indictment, appears to be that the economic substance doctrine made
it so obvious that these shelters would not work that the individual KPMG defendants
had to have known for certain that their efforts to sell them would violate a "known
legal duty." Superseding Indictment at 17, 25-26, United States v. Stein, No. 05-CR0888 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2005) (alleging that defendants' internal communications
revealed that they knew shelters would not survive court challenges and were "close
to frivolous"); see Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (holding that
proof of a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty" is an element of tax
evasion); United States v. Gurary, 860 F.2d 521, 525 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that tax
willfulness is an element of the crime of conspiracy to evade tax). Yet Chirelstein and
Zelenak appear to posit that the economic substance doctrine cannot produce that
level of certainty about a tax transaction. In correspondence, Professor Zelenak
noted that the Government also alleges that some of the promoted shelters were truly
shams - that is, the transactions that should have provided tax relief were not
genuinely as represented. E.g., Superseding Indictment, supra, at 16, 21-23 (alleging
that defendants in fact controlled supposedly "unrelated" parties to some
transactions, misrepresented independence of other participants in transactions and
163
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the same time, a number of other commentators - mostly
practitioners, it should be noted - claim that the uncertainty of the
doctrine overdeters innocent conduct, producing more social costs
than it saves.' 64 Professor Weisbach observes, aptly, that which of
these views is right is ultimately an empirical question for which we
have no current data. 65 Notwithstanding his warning, I will hazard

here a few additional thoughts.
First, it is not quite true that we have no data. For one thing, we
have the lessons of history, although I agree that in the end they are

inconclusive. Our early experiences with the law of corporate
reorganizations presented an experience very similar to Chirelstein
and Zelenak's proposal. On first enactment, the reorganization
provisions were fairly sketchy.' 66 Business taxpayers took advantage
of Congress' imprecise drafting and inexperience to pay very little
tax. 167

Congress responded with, in essence, a super-detailed code,

attempting to deal with every possible situation that might arise.'6 It
was an enormous failure; tax revenues from the affected industries
barely moved. 169 It was only Learned Hand, and later the Supreme

Court, whose early invocations of the economic substance doctrine
convinced taxpayers that they would have to pay or risk serious
170
penalties.
But we have to be careful with our history. 171 Is our

lesson that detailed rules can never work and standards do? Or is our
lesson that the particular code that Congress wrote in the 1920s failed,
claimed falsely that some transactions had a potential for profit). That would provide
an alternative ground for conviction whatever one's view of the legal determinacy of
the economic substance doctrine.
164 See Beller, supra note 33, at 3, 5 (summarizing American Bar Association
Section of Taxation comments); Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner'sPerspective on
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in
Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47 (2001); Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of
Antiabuse Rules: Lessons from the PartnershipAntiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L.
REV. 159 (2001); David P. Hariton, How to Fix Economic Substance, 2003 TNT 82-33,
539-40 (Apr. 29, 2003).
'65 Weisbach, supra note 38, at 248; see also Aprill, supra note 13, at 34.
166 "Sketchy," of course, is a highly scientific interpretative term. I derive this
discussion of the history from Steven A. Bank, Codifying JudicialDoctrines:No Cure
for Rules but More Rules?, 54 SMU L. REV. 37 (2001).
167 Id. at 42.
168

id.
Id.
170 Id. at 44.
169

171 Cf Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,

95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995) (warning of what the author perceives as lawyers'
misuses of historical analysis).
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perhaps despite a level of detail that would otherwise be a virtue?
With our one data point, we do not really know.
Another important source of data, though, is our reports from
other commentators about who is likely to respond to the incentive
effects of the doctrine in the manner they predict. Professor Zelenak
says that very aggressive shelter promoters and their customers need
bright-line rules.' Schler, Hariton, and others predict that sober and
careful members of the tax bar (like themselves) might be scared off
of good transactions by overly broad judicial doctrines.
Both camps
could easily be right, and neither seems to be making strong
predictions about the group described by the other camp. Quite
possibly, the same set of rules will have different effects on different
planners.
Supposing that both sets of predictions were right, what would be
the net outcome for society as a whole? Here, again, we have
Weisbach's point that we do not know the relative size of either group
or the magnitude of the costs or benefits that we could produce by
designing a rule aimed at them. 114 We would like to think that there
are more thoughtful and careful tax planners, and we suspect that
many aggressive planners will do what they do regardless of what the
rules are, bright or otherwise."' But we still do not know the
magnitude of the costs on either side. Neither group is likely to tell us
honestly and the "gap" between tax due and tax actually collected is
176
hard to measure.
In the best tradition of nonempiricist law professors everywhere,
though, I am going to guess, or rather, predict, that the net societal
effects of a flexible economic substance doctrine will be positive. I
172 Zelenak, supra note 39, at 187.
173

See Beller, supra note 33, at 3; Boyle, supra note 33, at 10; Kenneth W.

Gideon, Tax Law Works Best when the Rules Are Clear, 81 TAX NOTES 999, 1001
(Nov. 23, 1998); Kenneth J. Kies, A Critical Look at "Corporate Tax Shelter"
Proposals,83 TAX NOTES 1463 (June 7, 1999); Schler, supra note 8, at 383.
174 Weisbach, supra note 38, at 249. I assume here that it would be impractical, at
the very least from a political perspective, to design a rule that on its face treated
transactions by the two groups differently. We should keep in mind, though, that
reputational effects for repeat-player tax advisors might permit the Service to, in
effect, apply a different standard to aggressive lawyers. And, importantly, the lawyers
might well know that fact in advance. Thus, we could mitigate a rule written to deter
aggressive planning by treating careful advisors generously on audit, reducing the
danger of over-deterrence for their clients. I am grateful to Ethan Yale for making
this point.
175 See Eustice, supra note 114, at 136; Hariton, supra note 114, at 402.
176 See McMahon, supra note 20, at 207-08; Weisbach, supra note 38, at 243-44.
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think it is true that a flexible doctrine will have a deterrent effect on
careful advisors, but will not over-deter. I frankly do not understand
the claims of over-deterrence, given that the Service offers private
letter rulings in advance of a proposed transaction. 77 So the doctrine
will prevent many borderline transactions the Service says it believes
do not "work.', 178 My guess is that the revenue and anti-distortionary
benefits from that effect will swamp any losses that we might see from
the doctrine's failure to present aggressive planners with a big enough
stop sign. Planners who are attentive to rules are more sensitive to
the rules' deterrent effects. 179 Further, the Service is likely to discover
on audit "abusive" transactions by both groups at about the same
rate,' 8° but the thoughtful planners will win in litigation much more
often - because, after all, they are a lot more thoughtful and their
transactions will not be as clearly wrong. 8' Thus, if I am right that
there are more careful planners, the revenue savings from preventing
careful planners from recommending these transactions in the first
place ought to exceed the costs from generating more such
transactions from aggressive planners.' 82
Another factor we have to consider is the likelihood that not all
economic substance doctrines are created equal. Although it is true
that the doctrine's performance in the past has been uneven,' 83 future
177

Cf Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1960 (noting that Congress could

mitigate over-deterrence problems by expanding advance ruling programs). In
addition, as I described, see supra note 174, the Service can easily give either explicit
or implicit assurances to reputable counsel that their clients will not face the harshest
penalties for good faith but invalid transactions.
178 See Eustice, supra note 114, at 165; Thompson,
supra note 25, at 782;
Weisbach, supra note 38, at 249-50.
179 See Schler, supra note 8, at 385-86;
Thompson, supra note 25, at 782.
180This seems a dubious presumption, considering that careful
planners, one
might think, would be more likely to disclose their transactions to the Service rather
than hide them. The game theory of disclosure, however, is very complicated. If an
aggressive planner believes that disclosed transactions receive less scrutiny, she may
well advise her client to disclose. The Service may respond to this tactic by shifting
more scrutiny back to disclosed transactions, and so on. My prediction therefore
assumes that there will likely be an equilibrium point at which disclosed and
undisclosed transactions are discovered on audit at roughly the same rate.
181

Cf George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a

Lesson from History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209, 223 (2001) (noting "comparative resource
advantage" large corporate taxpayers have over government).
18 See Schler, supra note 8, at 384. It is also worth keeping
in mind here that a
subjective intent standard will be fairly fatal to mass-marketed shelters, so that each
transaction is likely to apply only to one or a small number of taxpayers.
183See Sheppard, supra note 13, at 7-8; Thompson, supra note 25, at 782.
For an
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results might well be much better. For one thing, we will have fixed a

major hole in the "subjective," business-purpose half of the test.
Before, courts struggled to define business purpose against a
backdrop of repeated claims that there is a "right" to tax planning9
We now can dispense with that difficulty by the expedient of making
clear that there is no such right.
On the objective end, we can probably do better than the welter
of existing rules, most of which seem to require some element of
market risk. As others have shrewdly observed, this simply leads to

ever-more difficult questions about just how much "risk" a transaction
must include to have objective "substance." 186 Since the only real
purpose for requiring risk is to make it somewhat harder to create a
shelter,' 87 the test inherently was undefinable.

Whether a given

amount of risk was "enough" depended on our view of just how
difficult it should be to engage in tax avoidance, a question that

necessarily varied from judge to judge.'8
formulation, in my view, is much better.
economic substance only if:

The Senate's recent
The Senate would find

(I) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from
Federal tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and (II)
the taxpayer has a substantial nontax purpose for entering
into such transaction and the transaction is a reasonable

means of accomplishing such purpose.189

impressive torturing of one respected iteration of the rule, see Hariton, supra note 23,
at 17-20.
184 See Weisbach, supra note 113, at 869-70 n.25 (describing "the culture of tax
compliance").
185 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594, 604-05 (6th Cir. 2006);
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 787 (5th Cir. 2001); UPS of
Am., Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018-19 (11th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 253 F.3d 350, 355 (8th Cir. 2001); ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 157
F.3d 231, 248-50 (3d Cir. 1998); Gilman v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir.
1991); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 94-95 (4th Cir. 1985);
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254, 284-85 (1999), affd per
curiam, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 561, 577, 583 (1978) (pointing to risk borne by taxpayer as one element
supporting its claim that transaction possessed economic substance).
1
Belier, supra note 33, at 3, 5; Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1949-50.
187 See Bankman, supra note 1, at 18-20; Hariton, supra note 23, at 31-32.
88 Cf.Dow Chem., 435 F.3d at 602 n.13 (rejecting dissenting opinion's proposed
approach to possibility-of-profit test because it would have been "too easily met").
189 S.3777, 109th Cong. § 201(a) (2006).
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Prong two here in fact covers not only the taxpayer's subjective

motivation. To tell the truth, prong two is a bit weak on that front; it
would be better to target any substantial tax planning motivation, for
the reasons I have already given. The objective form of the
transaction also matters. It could, for example, prevent tax benefits
for a transaction in which a reasonable businessperson would not have
engaged if not for tax reasons.19
This version improves dramatically over the old attempts by

setting out a standard that actually has a single answer, albeit one that
may sometimes be hard to measure.' More significantly, unlike the
old tests, taxpayers know the answer before they engage in the
transaction, because they know whether they, as reasonable people,

would do the deal if not for the tax component. 192 That means the
results of the test will be much more predictable for the people it is
aimed at deterring.
Putting the objective and subjective
improvements together, the revised doctrine may well be rather more
190

This prong of the proposal apparently aims at codifying David Hariton's

reading of the ACM holding, in which "[a] complicated way of investing cash lacks
economic substance - even though it obviously produces a profit - if it leaves the
taxpayer in substantially the same position as if the cash had been left in the bank."
David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAx LAW. 235,
235-36 (1999).
191 Professor Zelenak is skeptical of this approach, arguing that we cannot
determine whether a taxpayer's use of its funds is reasonable, because we do not
know what its alternative investment opportunities were. Zelenak, supra note 39, at
182. Perhaps. But most shelters require at least one other party, who rarely is
unaware of the tax benefits its cooperation is furnishing to the counterparty. This
means the tax benefits must be shared. As a result, the test would allow us in many
cases to show that a taxpayer incurred very large administrative costs (read: fees to
the shelter facilitator) relative to other investments of similar risk and expected
return. And, costs aside, it will often be easy to show that there were many
investment vehicles of similar return that were not nearly as complex in their
structure. Part of the test, as I read it, is whether a reasonable businessperson would
have undertaken the same investment in the same (complicated, but tax-favored)
way. Maybe creative tax planners will invent new shelters that are simple and cheap.
But if there were many of those around today, we would not be taking in much tax
revenue.
Michael Schler also attacks the idea of a standard in which favorable tax
treatment would be denied to "a normal business transaction carried on in a peculiar
manner solely for tax savings." Schler, supra note 8, at 340-42. Schler's main
argument is that such a rule would unfairly infringe on ordinary tax planning. Id. at
384-85. 1 have already dealt with those claims.
'92 Cf Weisbach, supra note 113, at 882 ("A transaction entered into without
regard for the tax system, for a true business purpose, is not likely to face any
significant uncertainty because of anti-abuse rules.").
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predictable than previous commentators have assumed in drawing
their conclusions.
For example, this version of the economic substance doctrine
would have dealt readily with the facts in Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States.'93 In that case, the taxpayer, the Frank Lyon Company, was an
intermediary (after winning a bidding competition) in a financing
arrangement between a bank and another lender to build a new
branch for the bank, where the bank was prohibited by regulations
from engaging the financing directly.' 94 Frank Lyon Company made a
down payment of $500,000, took nominal ownership of the branch and
The bank paid "rent" to Frank
received depreciation deductions.9
Lyon exactly equal to Frank Lyon's interest and principal mortgage
payments, which the bank was able to deduct in full. The bank had
the option to purchase the building by paying off the remaining
mortgage, repaying the $500,000 down payment, and paying Frank
Lyon six percent interest on the $500,000.' 96 As Justice Stevens
observed in dissent, in effect the bank had simply taken out first and
second mortgages and received from Frank Lyon a costless put
option.'9 Frank Lyon also gave the bank at least $100,000 in other
benefits.'9 8 The Court apparently found this transaction deeply
difficult to unravel, citing some twenty-six separate factors that went
into its holding. 99 Just how these twenty-six factors play out in other
cases is, to put it mildly, not self-evident. °
But under the standard I propose here, or one like it, we can stop
once we conclude that what happened, in essence, was that several
parties bid on the opportunity to put the bank's depreciation
deductions to better use than the bank. That this may have had
limited effects on the Treasury, as the Court noted,'O matters little to
us; we are concerned that we may have generated a deal that would
not likely have occurred - at least with Frank Lyon as the
counterparty - if not for the tax considerations. Even aside from the
subjective evidence - for example, the bidding war and Frank Lyon's
193435

U.S. 561 (1978).

'96

Id. at 563-65.
565-66.
Id. at 566-68.

'97

Id. at 585, 587 n.7 (Steven, J., dissenting).

198

Id. at 565.

'94

195 Id. at

Id. at 582-83.
For one of many efforts at deciphering Frank Lyon, see Joshua D. Rosenberg,
Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 433-39 (1988).
201 Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 580 n.15.
'99

200
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past history of having never engaged in this sort of investment - the
evidence on the objective side that this was not a transaction in which
an ordinary businessperson would engage, but for tax, was quite
strong. For one thing, there was the $100,000 sweetener Frank Lyon
threw in - an awfully large sum to get a six percent return on
$500,000. Then there was the cost, unquantified by the Court, of the
put option Frank Lyon granted the bank. Taken together, those look
not like ordinary investment costs, but instead like disproportionately
outsized transaction costs of just the kind our method would target:
those that evidence a slicing of the tax-benefit pie, rather than a pure
market-motivated investment. Frank Lyon, and other complex cases
like it, can become simple and predictable under a well-drawn statute.
Finally, we also have some methods for softening any overdeterrence costs. One way that comes to mind would be to give the
Service some authority to grant in advance broad exemptions at least
from shelter-related penalties. No tax rule will ever be entirely clear,
including our proposed economic substance codification. 202 There
may be some danger that businesses will hesitate to engage even in
subjectively tax-neutral transactions for fear that the Service will
characterize them as penalizable tax planning. 2°3 Thus, I would also
propose giving the Service regulatory authority to define safe harbors,
transactions that fall within a defined congressional tax subsidy. Good
faith efforts to qualify for a congressionally-intended benefit, or for a
Service-defined version of those benefits, would not be subject to
penalties, although the Service would have the power to recharacterize the transaction if it in fact failed to qualify. Again,
though, I freely concede that even with this mitigating rule my
prediction is largely guess-work.
Even if I am wrong (as seems reasonably likely) and we have no
particularly good information about the deterrent effects of any
particular form of shelter regulation, there are some reasons to put
the burden of proof on Chirelstein and Zelenak to show that brightline rules are clearly better than judge-enforced standards. As I
suggested before, their approach, although innovative and
tremendously insightful, has some costs not associated with a more
flexible doctrine.
First, the economic substance doctrine is rather broader in its
coverage than the set of Chirelstein and Zelenak rules, in that it could
202

Cf Bankman, supra note 1, at 19 ("The tax rules are not self-executing; that is,

the rules do not provide a single, apparent result for every economic transaction.").
20' See Canellos, supra note 164, at 50-51.
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also by its terms cover pure timing manipulations. °9 It could, in other
words, have the effect of reversing Cottage Savings Ass'n v.
205
Commissioner, so that transactions designed to accelerate the
realization of real losses could still be disallowed. Chirelstein and
Zelenak note that, in their view, mis-timing is not a significant
problem, and perhaps it is right that the possible dollar costs to the
Treasury are smaller in each transaction.20 6 But the timing of losses is
not only about the time value of money; it also often incorporates
significant administrative concerns. For example, consider the rules
prohibiting the recognition of built-in losses on boot2°7 received from
or property contributed to a controlled corporation,208 where in the
absence of a genuine
length transaction, valuation problems
• •• arm's
209
become very significant. In a deeper sense, questions of timing may
reflect not simply matters of practical administration but rather
fundamental views about the proper temporal frame of reference for
210
questions of distributive justice.
The other modest weakness of Chirelstein and Zelenak's proposal
is that it is, like a flu vaccine, effective for this generation of virus only.
Its relatively bright-line rules seem to me to be fairly stable targets for
would-be tax planners to avoid. Whatever it gains in certainty and
ease of administration, it loses in its capacity to adapt to innovative
forms of shelter planning. 2 ' But that, of course, is the tradeoff in any
204

Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1960-61.

205499

U.S. 554 (1991).

206 Chirelstein

& Zelenak, supra note 9, at 1960-61; see also Bankman, supra note
1, at 21-22 (predicting that courts will be less troubled by timing shelters). But cf.
Eustice, supra note 114, at 142, 156 (describing harms of timing shelters); Charlene
Davis Luke, Beating the "Wrap": The Agency Effort to Control Wraparound
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207 "Boot," for those with only a passing acquaintance with
colorful tax jargon, is
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choice of a rule over a standard. 2
In the face of these costs, I think we should expect some showing
that tax shelter rules in fact produce more social welfare than tax
shelter standards. And I do not think the data are there to make that
claim. As of now, it looks likely that a flexible, judicially-interpreted
economic substance doctrine, strengthened by some elements of the
Chirelstein and Zelenak proposal, is superior to relying on bright-line
silver bullets.
VI. CONCLUSION

The tax shelter problem is a large beast. No single paper, and
certainly not one of this size, can do it justice. But several worthwhile
points emerge in the analysis here. Most significantly, I think, this
discussion makes clear that textualism is likely not an inevitable
barrier for codification efforts. If our preference is for standards,
rather than rules that can ultimately be gamed by crafty counsel, we
should not give up the fight out of fear of the recalcitrant textualist.
Another point is that sometimes the best way to answer a big question
is to make it bigger. While commentators fret about the challenges in
distinguishing shelters from other tax planning, and how to describe
that difference in an administrable statute, the answer may be that
there is no reason even to try to draw the distinction.
I have just explained, in the last part of the preceding section, the
most concrete policy implications of our wrestling match with
textualist theory. I mentioned favorably there a version of a codified
economic substance doctrine proposed by the Senate but not enacted.
11
I have left largely untouched the parallel proposal by the JCT.
Others have already pointed out the likely flaws in that version. 214
Our analysis here confirms those judgments. The JCT's plan would
oblige a court to apply the JCT's version of the doctrine only where a
court first concludes that the doctrine applies. That leaves textualist
courts hostile to purposive interpretation free to ignore the doctrine. 211
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At the same time, it continues - and probably adds to - existing
doctrinal uncertainty about the applicability of the doctrine, which can
only undermine any deterrence value Congress hopes to gain from
codification. And it leaves unresolved the problem that incomplete
compliance with economic substance principles leaves other taxpayers
216
demoralized.
Finally, it is worth noting a few areas I have not addressed at all.
For one thing, I have examined only the "demand" side of the tax
planning business. Certainly there is much that could be said and
done about complementary rules for professional responsibility and
attorney or other tax preparer disclosure. 217 And my examination of
penalty provisions, and the problems of the audit lottery generally,
has been fairly cursory. Thus, the reader should not infer that, in
advocating for one formulation of the doctrine, I mean that there is
nothing else to be done.
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